In this paper, the traditional model of herd behavior was improved and extended. The herd behavior of risk-averse investor based on information cost was studied in the financial market. By refining the concept of Bayes equilibrium and the analysis of the behavior of investors, it was discovered that the herd behavior of the second risk-averse investor did not produce until the first risk-averse investors chose to buy information.
Introduction
Herding behavior of financial markets refers that the majority of individual investors tend to take the same or similar investment strategy with the others when making investment decisions. Causes of herd behavior include information asymmetry, the concern for the reputation and rewards programs (Sharma & Bikhchandani, 2000) , where the information asymmetry caused by the spread of information is an important reason for herd behavior. Banerjee (1992) was first proposed based on asymmetric information model of herd behavior. Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992,1998 ) also studied the relevant herd behavior model, although both models are different, they all believe that information diffusion is the cause of herd behavior.
As BHW model assumes that investors can get free private information , Cui Wei (2008) for the real market, raised the cost of herd behavior based on the information model, However, BHW model also assumes that investors are risk neutral, in which most investors in financial markets do not match the characteristics of risk aversion. In this paper, BHW model was further extension studied, and we analyzed the risk-averse investor herd behavior based on information costs, and by refining the concept and inductive method of Bayesian risk aversion of investors so as to get the optimal decision-making behavior.
The Model of Risk-Averse Investor Herd Behavior Based on the Information Cost
In this paper, the traditional basis of BHW model, the introduction of investor risk aversion in financial markets and the presence of the characteristics of information costs, with a negative exponential utility function is the risk aversion of investors, the cost of herd behavior based on the information model. Basic model assumptions are as follows:
1) The investment result
in the beginning is determined randomly.
represents investment result is well and represents investment result is bad. is equally likely to take on the values of and .
2) Each of the investors chooses whether to buy private signal before making a decision. Let i denote the cost that investment purchase information, assuming . 
Risk-Averse Investors Decision Analysis
After comparing the purchase information and do not purchase information expected return, risk averse investors before deciding whether to buy information. This section uses the Bayesian algorithm and the inductive method to analyze investors optimal information cost and make the optimal investment decisions to maximize the expected return.
The First Risk Averse Investor's Investment Decisions A1
In order to analyze the first investor risk aversion A1 investment decisions, you first need to discuss the situation given information costs, and then further discuss the best information costs.
Case Given Information Costs
Information costs are assumed, the signal accuracy is. According to Bayes rule, in the purchase of information, the first investor risk aversion investment results A1 update their beliefs as:
If you get a good signal A1, then A1 investment results are good update belief; if A1 get is bad signal, then the result is good for investors A1 updated belief. A1 in getting a good signal and bad signal to make investment decisions after the expected benefits are: 
There
So ended the first A1 in investor risk aversion will not be a bad signal for investment.
Proposition 1 Assume
Proposition 1 is true can guarantee a good signal was observed after the first risk averse investor must invest A1. Otherwise, regardless of the resulting signal A1 is good or bad, A1 will not invest, so that investors behind the A1 will not be able to grasp the behavior of their access to real information. The second risk averse investors A2 and A1 will face the same situation, so A2 would not choose to invest, and after that all investors will not invest. Thus, if Proposition 1 is false, no one making investment decisions, and no one involved in the decision-making model. Proposition 1 is equivalent to   Intuitively, since investors are risk averse, the accuracy of the signal must be larger to ensure investors.
In the case of Proposition 1 is true, A1 will make investment decisions according to its private signal, that is, while getting good signal   , ,
e e e , ,
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The first risk aversion investor, the probability of obtaining good signals and bad A1 were 50%, therefore, A1 expected return after purchase information is:
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If A1 chooses not to purchase information, the A1 fo ment results for the good faith is the public belief, i.e. 
The first risk averse investors A1 is willing to buy private information. 
Lemma 1 Assum
Under the conditions in Lemma 1, Proposition 2 is true guarantee of a risk averse investor A1 never buys a private e. If A1 is not purchasing information, then the result is investment belief is 0.5, the probability of investment is 0.5. So, A1 investment decisions investors will not give back any of the information transmitted, the second investor risk aversion and A1 A2 facing the same situation mpathy, A2, and behind all investors will not buy information, which model lo At the same time, the optim investme al nt decision A1 is make decisions according to their private signals, namely when the it gains signal   
e e  So, in the absence of purch n ormation, the second risk avoidance investors A2 the optimal decision is a choice, and A2 after investment earnings are ected to be:
Then, the second risk aversion investor A2 in bu mation and not to buy the expected return of the comparison. If th ying infore given information for cost, when the A2 is a good sign, she updated belief as the result of the investment: 
